Savings for retirement under liquidity constraints: A note by Corsini, Lorenzo & Spataro, Luca
1 
 
Savings for retirement under liquidity constraints: a note 
Lorenzo Corsini* and Luca Spataro† 
Abstract 
Pension systems often entail some compulsory saving over 
which individuals have some degree of choice in terms of the 
pension plan in which to invest. We analyse whether the 
choice between alternative plans is affected by the presence 
of liquidity constraints during working life and we prove that 
the analytical conditions that determine the choice between 
different plans are the same in the constrained and 
unconstrained case. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern pension systems usually entail compulsory savings over which workers have some degree of choice 
in terms of the pension plan in which to invest. Given the existence of compulsory savings, agents could 
find it optimal to indebt themselves in order to off-set too large compulsory rates of contribution. Their 
saving decisions might thus be affected by the presence of incomplete financial markets that prevent them 
from borrowing the desired amount. Consequentially, liquidity constraints could affect their investment 
choice. The aim of our work is to analyse what happens to agents’ decisions on pension plans when 
liquidity constraints are binding. 
A vast literature has stressed that liquidity constraints affect the amounts saved for retirement (for a 
review see Magnussen 1994) but not much has been said on how they affect the destination of those 
savings. Contributions from Dutta et al. (2000), Wagener (2003), Matsen and Thogersen (2004) De Menil et 
al. (2006), Corsini and Spataro (2011) and Corsini et al. cover the topic of decisions on pension plans but 
none of them focus on the role of liquidity constraints nor examine in details the emergence of corner 
solutions. 
Our contribution extends a model of optimal choice on pension plans developed by Corsini and Spataro 
(2011) and, differently from it, focuses on the corner solutions that emerge in the presence of liquidity 
constraints. Our results show that liquidity constraints do not affect the decisions in terms of the pension 
plan chosen. The implications of our results are twofold. First, from a methodological point of view, the 
drop of liquidity constraints from this analysis allows for better analytical tractability without any loss in the 
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generality of results. The second implication concerns economic policy: according to our findings, 
authorities can choose their preferred compulsory contribution rate without worrying that, inducing 
liquidity constraints, they might somehow bias, through this channel, the choice of individuals’ investment 
plans. In addition, authorities may desire to provide incentives to certain pension plans (for example, to 
those with higher shares of stocks because this contributes to the development of stock markets or to a 
higher degree of diversification of individuals’ saving portfolios): our result implies that the lessening or 
tightening of financial constraints (for example, granting easier access to credit services) might not be an 
effective instrument to achieve this objective. 
The work is organized as follows: section 2 develops the basic model with complete financial markets; 
section 3 introduces incomplete financial markets and explores the role of liquidity constraints and section 
4 concludes.  
2. Saving decisions under complete financial markets 
We assume that agents live two periods: in the first they work receiving a wage w and consuming part of 
their income; in the second they retire, consuming what they have saved. Saving is partly voluntary, 
cumulated at the risk-free rate rS, and partly compulsory since pension system forces individuals to save a 
fixed contribution rate   in a pension plan of their choice. For sake of simplicity we imagine that only two 
plans exist: (i) a safe plan S with the risk-free rate of return rS and (ii) a risky plan R whose returns are 
normally distributed with mean rR and variance 
2
R . Agents choose how much to consume and to save and 
which pension plan to adopt. Basically, individuals compute their expected indirect utility under the two 
plans and then choose the one bestowing the highest indirect utility. Thus we first compute the expected 
indirect utility for each plan: this is done solving a maximization problem with respect to first period 
consumption. With complete financial markets, an individual under the generic plan i faces the following 
problem: 
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where   21,ccUE  is the expected lifetime utility that depends on consumption in the two periods (c1 and 
c2 respectively). The constraint in Eq. (1) represents the budget constraint: second period consumption is 
given only by the returns from compulsory and voluntary saving. 
A closed form solution can be obtained assuming the following utility function    
2) 21
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where   is the rate of time preference and a is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
Following Makarov and Schornick (2010) we assume that a depends on wage with  wka , where 
0 represents the elasticity of risk-aversion-to-wage and k is a positive scale factor. This assumption 
allows us to obtain decreasing-in-income risk aversion, a property that is usually considered the most 
realistic one. 
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Given Eq. (2), we can solve1 problem (1) for each plan and obtain the following solution in terms of optimal 
consumption 
*
,1 ic  and indirect expected utility  *iUE :  
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Individuals choose plan R if    ** SR UEUE   and according to Eq. (4) this inequality is verified if and only if  
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thus the sign of dR determines agents’ decisions in terms of pension plans. However, this result is obtained 
in the absence of liquidity constraints: in the next section we explore the case of liquidity constraints. 
 
3. The role of liquidity constraints 
If individuals cannot borrow during their working period, the problem (1) can be restated as 
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where the second constraint represents the non-borrowing condition and implies that first period 
consumption cannot exceed net income and that Eqs. (3) and (4) represent now the inner solution of the 
problem. In particular (6) has an inner solution for 
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When the above condition does not hold, constraints become binding. Condition (7) depends on the plan 
chosen so that constraints might be binding under a plan but not under the other. For plan S, we 
have 0sd  and Eq. (7) becomes: 
                                                          
1
 Consider that, for any variable zj distributed normally with mean z and variance 
2
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See Varian (1992) for details. 
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For plan R we can insert (5) in (7) and obtain the following: 
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The above is a second order equation in   whose roots are
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Exploiting conditions (8) and (9) we draw in Fig. 1 the couples  ,w  for which optimal consumption in 
period one is exactly equal to income. We depict three possible cases depending on the value of the 
parameter . Curve S represents the safe plan and is obtained from condition (8) so that, above curve S, 
liquidity constraints are binding under the plan S. Curves R and R’ represent the risky plan and are obtained 
from condition (9) so that within these two curves liquidity constraints are binding under plan R. Curve D 
represents the couples  ,w  for which 0Rd : above it we have 0Rd  while below it we have 0Rd .  
 
Fig. 1: Regions where constraints are binding 
Curves S, R and R’ define four regions: in region I constraints are not binding for either plans; in region II 
constraints are binding under both plans; in region III constraints are binding only under plan S and, in 
region IV, constraints are binding only under plan R. Note that region III completely lies above curve D and 
thus within this region we have 0Rd , while for region IV the reverse is true. 
Whenever the system is outside region I, condition (7) does not hold for at least a plan and, therefore, 
optimal consumption and indirect utilities are no longer described by Eqs. (3) and (4) but instead the 
following corner solutions2 emerge (the C index denotes the solution when constraints are binding): 
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111 . 
The above corner solutions show that, in line with previous literature, the amount saved is affected by 
liquidity constraints. However, it is still arguable whether such constraints affect the decision on the 
destination of the compulsory savings. To assess this point we present now three lemmas that characterize 
individuals’ decisions on pension plans when constraints are potentially binding. We will then use the 
lemmas to formulate a proposition that fully describes individuals’ decision on pension plans. 
 
LEMMA 1. If constraints are binding under both the S and R plans, then R (S) is chosen if and only if 
 0Rd .  
PROOF. If constraints are binding under both plans, then plan R is chosen if and only 
if     0 CSCR UEUE . Starting from Eqs. (11) and (12) and going through computations, we have: 
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1 . The latter is greater than zero if and only if dR>0. ■ 
Lemma 1 tells us that if constraints are binding under both plans, then individuals’ choice is still univocally 
determined by the value of dR. From a graphical point of view, it tells us that if parameters are such that an 
individual lies within region II of Fig. 1, then being below (above) Curve D implies the choice of plan R (S) 
and vice-versa. The economic rationale is that, if constraints are binding under both plans, consumption in 
period one is clearly the same: thus the chosen plan is the one that bestows higher expected utility in 
period two, which is univocally determined by the sign of dR. 
LEMMA 2. If constraints are binding under S (R) plan but not under R (S) plan, then we necessarily have 
dR<(>)0. 
PROOF. If constrains are binding only under the S (R) then condition (7) must be false (true) for i=S but true 
(false) for i=R. Given condition (7), this happens only if     
x
x
Rxkw
x
xkw
x
d

  11
1log
1
1log
11 1)(1 

   which can 
only be true if dR<(>)0. ■ 
Graphically, this means that region III (IV) in Fig. 1 is necessarily above (below) Curve D. The economic 
mechanism behind this result rests on the fact that individuals select, on the base of the sign of dR, the plan 
that implies the higher expect wealth and thus under the chosen plan, given normality of consumption, 
consumption must be higher in both periods: therefore, it is not possible that an individual is constrained 
under the non-chosen plan but not under the chosen one. 
LEMMA 3. If constraints are binding under the S (R) plan but not under the R (S) plan, then 
0)(Rd implies the choice of S (R).  
PROOF. If constraints are binding only under plan S, then the indirect expected utilities are: 
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We start comparing the first term of  CSUE  as given by (13) with the first term of  
*
RUE  as given by (14): 
since by assumption the constraint is not binding under scheme R, it must be  wc R  1
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We now compute the difference D between the second term of  CSUE , as given in Eq. (13), and the second 
term of  *RUE : 
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The above is positive for     1log11 1 kw
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second term of  *RUE . 
Since the first term of  CSUE  is always larger than the first term of  
*
RUE  and since 0Rd  implies that 
second term of  CSUE  is larger than the second term of  
*
RUE , it follows that 0Rd implies that 
   *RCS UEUE  . ■ The same arguments can be used to prove the case where constraints are binding 
under the R plan but not under the S plan. 
From a graphical point of view, Lemma 3 tells that, within region III and region IV of Fig. 1, being below 
(above) Curve D implies the choice of plan R (S). The economic intuition behind this result is that the 
presence of binding constraints under only a plan is exactly due to the fact that the particular plan implies 
higher expected wealth and consumption and is, therefore, the chosen plan. 
From the three lemmas the following proposition descends 
PROPOSITION 1. When individuals face liquidity constraints, they chose plan R (S) if and only if  0Rd . 
PROOF. If liquidity constraints are present, they can be binding: (i) under neither plan, (ii) under both plans, 
(iii) under plan S only or (iv) under plan R only. In case (i) we obtain inner solutions and we know from Eq. 
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(5) that individuals choose the plan R (S) if and only if  0Rd . In case (ii) we know from Lemma 1 that 
individuals choose plan R (S) if and only if  0Rd . In case (iii) we know from Lemma 2 that dR is 
necessarily negative and thus, from Lemma 3, plan S is chosen. In case (iv) we know from Lemma 2 that dR 
is necessarily positive and thus, from Lemma 3, plan R is chosen. Therefore in all possible cases the pension 
plan R (S) is chosen if and only if  0Rd .■ 
Proposition 1 basically combines together all the possible combinations in terms of plans and liquidity 
constraints (that is, all the regions within Fig. 1) and it shows that, in all the possible combinations, the 
presence of liquidity constraints does not affect the decision on which retirement plan to invest into and 
this is true even when constraints are actually binding. From a policy point of view, this result shows that, if 
the authorities desire to provide incentives to certain investment plans, they should target the 
determinants of the variable dR rather than lessen or tighten financial constraints. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Our analysis explores investment choices on retirement savings when liquidity constraints are binding. We 
show that liquidity constraints affect decisions on how much to save for retirement but they do not affect 
the destination of compulsory savings. In fact we prove that the very conditions for which constraints are 
binding also guarantee that the choice on pension plans remains the same as in the unconstrained case. 
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